Objectives: When judging someone's trustworthiness, facial appearance is a salient but nondiagnostic cue. Such judgments should ideally be based on the memory of that person's past behaviors during social interaction. Aging may impair memory-based decision making, predicting an age-related decline in individuals' adjustment of trustworthiness judgment using such behavioral information. However, aging may also facilitate the use of diagnostic information for social inference, predicting an age-related improvement. I tested these competing predictions to obtain insight into the effects of aging on fraud victimization. Method: Thirty-six older adults (OAs) and 36 younger adults (YAs) played four rounds of a trust game wherein they were the truster and had to learn the distinction between "good" and "bad" trustees who always cooperated with and cheated participants, respectively. The trustee's facial appearance (trustworthy-and untrustworthy looking) and character (good and bad) were manipulated orthogonally. Results: A memory test of the trustees' characters revealed that even after four rounds of the game, OAs, but not YAs, were biased to guess that trustworthy-looking persons were good trustees. Discussion: Persistent reliance on facial trustworthiness could increase one's risk of repeated fraud victimization among OAs, because fraudulent people can pretend to look trustworthy to acquire another's trust.
Trustworthiness judgment, or discerning whether someone is a cooperator or a cheater, is critical to social life. It enables us to enjoy the benefits of mutual cooperation while avoiding being cheated (Cosmides & Tooby, 1989) . We are so keen to assess another's trustworthiness that we make initial judgments about it immediately on the basis of facial appearance (Willis & Todorov, 2006) . Face-based trustworthiness judgment, however, has little predictive validity (Rule, Krendl, Ivcevic, & Ambady, 2013) ; such judgments should instead be based on that person's actual behavior in a social exchange. In other words, persistence of face-based trustworthiness judgment would increase one's risk of being cheated, because cheaters can pretend to look trustworthy to cultivate trust (Suzuki & Suga, 2010; Trivers, 1971) . It is therefore important to clarify age-related differences in reliance on perception (e.g., facial appearance) and memory (e.g., behavioral history) for trustworthiness judgment after a social exchange to obtain insight into the effects of aging on fraud victimization (Ross, Grossmann, & Schryer, 2014; Wood, Liu, Hanoch, & Estevez-Cores, 2015) . There are two independent lines of research on this issue, each with opposing predictions.
The first line relates to age-related differences in value learning. In typical experiments, participants learn the values of multiple options after repeated experiences of choosing one and winning or losing money as a result (Denburg, Tranel, & Bechara, 2005; Samanez-Larkin, Kuhnen, Yoo, & Knutson, 2010) . Such experiments have commonly demonstrated an age-related slowing in value learning (Eppinger, Hämmerer, & Li, 2011; Mata, Josef, Samanez-Larkin, & Hertwig, 2011) , indicating that aging interferes with the updating of value representations via experience (Samanez-Larkin & Knutson, 2015) . Trustworthiness can be conceptualized as the "social value" of a person, and, indeed, its learning shares computational principles and neural mechanisms with value learning (Behrens, Hunt, Woolrich, & Rushworth, 2008; Fareri, Chang, & Delgado, 2015) . These considerations predict that compared with younger adults (YAs), older adults (OAs) would have greater difficulty in adjusting their judgments of someone's trustworthiness according to that person's behavioral history in a social exchange and would instead persistently rely on facial trustworthiness.
The second line of research relates to age-related differences in trait inference. In typical experiments, participants read descriptions of positive and negative behaviors of a target person, which prompt inferences about that target's traits, such as their morality and ability (Hess & Auman, 2001; Hess, Bolstad, Woodburn, & Auman, 1999; Leshikar, Park, & Gutchess, 2015) . These studies have shown that OAs are more sensitive to the diagnosticity of behavioral information when making trait inferences than are YAs (Hess, 2006) . For example, negative behavior is regarded as more diagnostic than is positive behavior in morality judgments because immoral people occasionally act good (e.g., temporarily cooperating to abuse another's trust), whereas moral people are never expected to act bad (Reeder & Spores, 1983; Skowronski & Carlston, 1987) . It has been observed that, compared with YAs, OAs have a greater tendency to weigh negative information more heavily than positive information in morality judgments; however, such age-related differences were not found in ability judgment, wherein positive information was considered more diagnostic (Hess & Auman, 2001; Hess et al., 1999) . Thus, if aging facilitates the use of trait diagnostic information, it is predicted that after a social exchange, OAs would base their trustworthiness judgments on the behavioral history of the person (i.e., diagnostic information) while disregarding the facial appearance (i.e., nondiagnostic information) to a greater extent than would YAs. Bell, Giang, Mund, and Buchner (2013) recently reported an empirical investigation into this issue. Participants played a single round of a version of the trust game (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995) wherein they were the truster-in each trial, they decided how much to invest in a "joint business" with a trustee, whose face was displayed on a computer monitor, and then were given feedback on whether the trustee had invested the same amount (i.e., cooperation) or nothing (i.e., cheating). The facial appearance (trustworthy-or untrustworthy looking) and behavioral character (cooperator or cheater) of the trustees were manipulated orthogonally. The game was followed by a surprise source memory test asking participants to recall each trustee's behavior (i.e., source). Multinomial processing tree (MPT) modeling was then used to assess participants' response bias and source memory accuracy (Batchelder & Riefer, 1999 ; see also Analysis in the Method section of this paper). Notably, both OAs and YAs were more biased toward guessing that the trustees had cheated when their faces were untrustworthy looking than when they were trustworthy looking, which suggested that there is difficulty in adjusting trustworthiness judgments after only a one-shot exchange (viz., there is a persistent impact of facial appearance) across age-groups. However, among YAs, source memory of cheating was more accurate than was that of cooperation when trustees looked trustworthy; the opposite trend was found when trustees looked untrustworthy, although this was nonsignificant. Among OAs, source memory of cheating was more accurate irrespective of trustees' facial appearance. These results suggest that YAs may be more sensitive than OAs to the discrepancy between facial appearance and behavior (e.g., cheating by a trustworthy-looking person), potentially enabling them to more effectively adjust their trustworthiness judgments after social exchange.
To understand and extend the scope of the implications of Bell et al. (2013) , it would be important to consider the incidental nature of their experimental procedure; in other words, participants did not expect to interact with the trustees again. OAs are known to be highly selective in their use of cognitive resources (Hess, 2014; Middlebrooks, McGillivray, Murayama, & Castel, 2015) . Consequently, the OAs in Bell et al. (2013) might have exerted little effort to encode the trustees' behaviors that were irrelevant in the single-round trust game. Such low-level engagement could have particularly interfered with OAs' memory for behaviors incongruent with facial appearance, given that unexpected information requires elaborative processing to integrate it with prior beliefs (Macrae, Bodenhausen, Schloerscheidt, & Milne, 1999) . Therefore, the age-related difference observed in Bell et al. (2013) might disappear if learning about the trustees' behaviors was task relevant (Hess, Follett, & McGee, 1998) . One straightforward way of making the learning task relevant would be to repeat the trust games; to be successful in iterative games, players must decide whether to trust a given partner by referring to his/her past behavior (e.g., decide to trust only when he/she has cooperated previously; Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981) . Thus, examining trustworthiness judgments after repeated social exchanges could clarify whether OAs' judgment is less adaptive than is YAs' even when they understand the importance of remembering partners' behaviors and adjusting their trustworthiness judgments accordingly. This investigation would also be of practical interest because it could give insight into individuals' cognitive vulnerabilities to "repeat victimization" by fraud (Farrell, 2005) . Therefore, in the present study, I investigated age-related differences in trustworthiness judgment after repeated social exchanges. Specifically, OAs and YAs played four rounds of a version of the trust game (i.e., investment game) with 16 trustees (investees). The facial appearance (trustworthy-or untrustworthy looking) and behavioral character (cooperator or cheater) of the investees were manipulated orthogonally. The literature on value learning (Samanez-Larkin & Knutson, 2015) and trait inference (Hess, 2006) would predict an age-related decline and improvement, respectively, in the adjustment of trustworthiness judgment after repeated social exchanges. Thus, the main objective of this study was to test which prediction is valid.
Method

Participants
Thirty-six OAs (17 males; aged 65-79 years) and 36 YAs (17 males; aged 19-30 years) participated in this study for payment (1,000 yen [about 10 US dollars] per hour). Community-dwelling OAs were recruited under the condition that they were 65 years of age or over and did not report suffering from visual, auditory, or motor impairments that hampered their daily living. YAs were undergraduate and graduate students. Two OAs (1 male) and two YAs (2 males) reported a history of mental or neurological illness, so their data were excluded from the analysis. The remaining 68 participants scored at least 27 of 30 on the Mini-Mental State Examination (Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975) , indicating no signs of dementia (Kukull et al., 1994) .
The basic characteristics of the two age-groups are summarized in Table 1 . Briefly, OAs showed less accurate face perception, slower processing speed, poorer associative memory, a lower level of depression, and higher general trust than did YAs, which is consistent with the reported effects of aging on these variables (Benton & Van Allen, 1968; Blazer, 2003; Castle et al., 2012; Naveh-Benjamin, 2000; Salthouse, 1996) . OAs also had fewer years of education than did YAs, which suggested a cohort effect. Because OAs do not typically have fewer years of education than do YAs, this variable was treated as a nuisance covariate in the analyses of covariance (ANCOVAs) testing age-related differences.
Face Stimuli
One hundred and twenty neutral faces of young Japanese individuals (54 men and 66 women) from the Facial Information Norm Database (Watanabe et al., 2007) were rated in terms of trustworthiness on a 5-point scale (1 = very untrustworthy to 5 = very trustworthy) in a pilot study, in which 102 OAs (51 males; aged 60-79 years) and 102 YAs (51 males; aged 18-30 years) participated; they were different from those participating in the main experiment. Twelve faces (6 males) rated as trustworthy by both OAs and YAs were selected as stimuli to be used in the main experiment, OAs: 3.44 (mean) ± 0.18 (SD), YAs: 3.52 ± 0.19, t(11) = -1.09, p = 0.300. (More specifically, the six most trustworthy-looking male and female faces were selected based on the mean ratings of all participants on the conditions that the mean ratings of OAs and YAs were both greater than 3 and that the difference between the mean ratings of OAs and YAs was no greater than 0.5. The untrustworthy-looking faces were selected in a similar manner.) Twelve untrustworthy-looking faces were also selected, OAs: 2.31 ± 0.26, YAs: 2.21 ± 0.21, t(11) = 1.72, p = 0.113. The 24 face stimuli were then divided into three sets, each containing an equal number of trustworthy-and untrustworthy-looking male and female faces. I ensured that the averages (across the age-groups) of the trustworthiness ratings for the trustworthy-and untrustworthy-looking faces were similar among the three sets (trustworthy looking: 3.47 [mean] ± 0.07 [SD], 3.48 ± 0.16, and 3.50 ± 0.16; untrustworthy looking: 2.29 ± 0.16, 2.25 ± 0.23, and 2.25 ± 0.30).
The three sets of faces were each assigned to one of the three character conditions (good, bad, or neutral; see the Procedure and Tasks section for details) in a counterbalanced manner across participants. All stimuli were in gray scale and were cropped into square shapes (240 × 240 pixels) so that only the internal facial features (eyes, eyebrows, nose, and mouth) were visible.
Procedure and Tasks
Each participant was tested individually in a quiet room. At the beginning of the experiment, the nature of the study was explained to the participants, and written informed consent was obtained. Participants then completed a series of tasks that took about 60 and 80 min for YAs and OAs, respectively, on average. The tasks were as follows: baseline trustworthiness rating, investment game, and trustworthiness memory test. All three tasks were programmed using E-Prime 2.0 (Psychology Software Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh, PA, USA) and were presented on a laptop computer (HP ProBook 4740s, Hewlett-Packard Japan, Ltd, Tokyo, Japan; display resolution was set to 800 × 600 pixels). The size of the face stimuli on the laptop display was about 8.5 × 8.5 cm, and the distance between the display and participants was roughly 50 cm.
Baseline trustworthiness rating
In each trial, a face stimulus was presented on the laptop display until the participant responded. Participants rated each face in terms of trustworthiness on a 6-point scale (1 = very untrustworthy to 6 = very trustworthy) by pressing a key. Participants were told that a "trustworthy person" means somebody who is likely to cooperate, reciprocate another's benevolence, and be honest, whereas an "untrustworthy person" is someone who is likely to cheat, take advantage of another's benevolence, and be deceitful.
Participants had to rate each face intuitively on the basis of its appearance. The 24 stimuli were presented once in random order during this task. This task was included as a manipulations check to ensure that OAs and YAs similarly discriminated between trustworthy-and untrustworthylooking faces.
Investment game
In this game, participants were asked to decide in each trial whether to invest 1 million yen (approximately US$10,000; this rather large amount was chosen because 1 million yen may reflect an "investment" for Japanese people because of the introduction of a new tax exemption program called Nippon Individual Savings Account as of January 2014, which ensures that income from annual investments of up to 1 million yen is exempt from taxation, Japan Securities Dealers Association, 2014.) in an investee whose face was presented on the laptop display. They were told that half of the investees were good and would therefore double the deposit and yield a profit of 1 million yen, whereas the others were bad and thus would embezzle the money.
In each trial, an investee's face was presented along with a prompt asking participants for their investment decision ("Y: Deposit 1 million yen" and "N: Do not deposit 1 million yen") until participants responded; this was followed by a feedback display for 5 s (Figure 1 ). When participants gave money to a good investee by pressing the "Y" key, the feedback read, "Good investee. You gained one million yen." In contrast, when money was given to a bad investee, the feedback read, "Bad investee. You lost one million yen." When participants chose not to deposit by pressing the "N" key, the feedback only indicated whether the investee was good or bad.
The game comprised four blocks. In each block, 16 faces from the good and bad character conditions were presented once in a random order as good and bad investees, respectively; the eight faces assigned to the neutral character condition did not appear in this task. Participants were told that the same investees appeared repeatedly across the blocks and that their characters did not change. Earnings from the game were calculated and displayed at the end of each block. Participants were told that an amount proportional to the maximum block earnings would be given to them as reward (e.g., a 500-yen reward for earnings of 5 million yen). Their task was to memorize whether each investee was good or bad through iterated transactions and to earn as much money as possible by investing accordingly. After completion of the task, participants rated how much effort they had put into memorizing good and bad investees, separately, on a 6-point scale (1 = not at all to 6 = very much).
Trustworthiness memory test
For each trial, a person's face was presented on the laptop display along with three alternatives ("good," "bad," or "did not appear") until participants responded; they judged whether the person was a good or a bad investee from the investment game or had not appeared in the game (i.e., neutral character condition) by pressing a key. The 24 stimuli appeared once in random order during the task.
Analysis
The trustworthiness memory test can be regarded as a type of source memory task by considering the investee's character as the "source" (Bell et al., 2013) . Theoretically, source memory performance is determined by several distinct cognitive states, including item recognition, source discrimination, and guessing or response bias (Batchelder & Riefer, 1999; Bayen, Murnane, & Erdfelder, 1996) . For example, a good investee might be correctly judged as "good" because participants recognize him/her as having appeared in the investment game (i.e., successful item recognition) and recall that he/she has a good character (i.e., successful source discrimination). However, even when participants fail in item f General Trust Scale (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994; 4-16) .
recognition and source discrimination, they might accidentally obtain the correct answer simply by guessing. Thus, there is a problem of disentangling the contributions of respective cognitive states to source memory performance. To address this issue, I performed MPT modeling analysis (Batchelder & Riefer, 1999) in the present paper. Specifically, I used the same model as Bell et al. (2013) did (Figure 2 ; see Bayen et al., 1996 for the validation of the model). Take again the judgment of a good investee: the MPT model supposes that correctly judging that an individual is a good investee is realized via three different cognitive pathways: (a) participants successfully recognize the person as having appeared in the game (with probability D Good ) and then successfully recall his/her good character (with probability d Good ), (b) participants successfully recognize the person (with probability D Good ) but then fail to recall that he/she has a good character (with probability 1 − d Good ) but then correctly guess it (with probability g Good ), and (c) participants fail to recognize the person (with probability 1 − D Good ) but then correctly guess that he/she appeared in the game (with probability b) and that he/she has a good character (with probability g Good ). According to this model, the probability that a good investee is correctly judged as "good" can be represented by the following equation. 
Likewise, participants may incorrectly judge a good investee as "bad" when (a) they successfully recognize him/ her (with probability D Good ), but then fail to recall that he/ she has a good character (with probability 1 -d Good ) and incorrectly guess that he/she has a bad character (with probability 1 − g Good ), or when (b) they fail to recognize him/her (with probability 1 − D Good ), but correctly guess that he/she appeared (with probability b), but incorrectly guess that he/she has a bad character (with probability 1 − g Good ). Additionally, participants incorrectly judge a good investee as having not appeared in the game when they fail to recognize him/her (with probability 1 − D Good ) and then incorrectly guess that he/she did not appear (with probability 1 − b). Consequently, the following two equations are obtained:
and P(Judgment: Did not appear
The model shown in Figure 2 supposes that similar multiple cognitive pathways underlie the judgments of a bad investee and a noninvestee, resulting in a total of three parameters for item recognition (D Good , D Bad , and D Not ), two parameters for source discrimination (d Good and d Bad ), and two parameters for guessing or response bias (b and g Good ). Thus, equations analogous to Equations (1) through (3) can be derived for the judgments of a bad investee and a noninvestee as well. Data (i.e., observed probabilities) are substituted into the left side of each equation, and the parameters are estimated so that the equations hold as closely as possible.
To examine the age-related differences and effects of investees' facial appearance, each parameter was allowed to differ between OAs and YAs and between trustworthyand untrustworthy-looking investees. The following two assumptions were made to enable unique estimation of the parameters. First, the probability of the correct recognition of a noninvestee was set to be equal to the mean of the probabilities of the correct recognition of good and bad investees:
Second, for YAs, the probabilities of the correct recognition of good and bad investees were set to be equal:
The same assumptions were used and justified by Bell et al. (2013) . Parameter estimation and hypothesis testing for the MPT model were performed using the MPTinR package (Singmann & Kellen, 2013) Assessment of the model data fit and all hypothesis testing were performed using the G 2 statistic (Singmann & Kellen, 2013) . Briefly, the G 2 represents the degree of "misfit" of a model to the data-in other words, it quantifies the degree of discrepancy between observed probabilities and predicted probabilities from the estimated model and asymptotically follows a χ 2 distribution. The fit of the base model (Figure 2 ) to the data was deemed satisfactory if G 2 did not differ significantly from 0 according to a χ 2 test. Additionally, two parameter estimates were regarded as different if an increase in the G 2 (ΔG 2 ) due to the equality assumption significantly differed from 0 according to a χ 2 test. The significance level was set at α = 0.05 for all statistical inferences. The Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied to repeated-measures ANCOVAs. The p values were adjusted for multiple comparisons with the Bonferroni method when appropriate. Means are presented with their standard errors (M ± SE) unless otherwise stated.
Results
Baseline Trustworthiness Rating
OAs and YAs gave similar trustworthiness ratings to the trustworthy-looking faces (4.07 ± 0.09 [OAs] vs. 4.01 ± 0.07 [YAs] ) and untrustworthy-looking faces (2.73 ± 0.09 [OAs] vs. 2.71 ± 0.08 [YAs] ). This was corroborated by an ANCOVA of trustworthiness ratings with age-group and investee's face and character as factors and with years of education as a covariate-namely, only the main effect of face was significant, F(1, 65) = 4.46, p = 0.039, η p 2 = 0.064.
Investment Game
The mean self-reported efforts to memorize good and bad investees were as follows: for good investees, 4.32 ± 0.16 (OAs) and 4.74 ± 0.14 (YAs); for bad investees, 4.44 ± 0.15 (OAs) and 4.97 ± 0.17 (YAs). An ANCOVA with agegroup and investee's character as factors, and with years of Figure 2 . Multinomial processing tree model describing the latent cognitive states assumed to underlie performance on the trustworthiness memory test. The model is equivalent to the one used in Bell et al. (2013) . Rounded rectangles on the far left of the figure represent the types of stimulus persons (i.e., Good = good investee, Bad = bad investee, Not = person who did not appear in the investment game). Rectangles on the far right of the figure represent the categories of participants' responses. Letters and numbers along the lines represent the probabilities with which certain cognitive states occur: D = probability of successful item recognition (i.e., correctly judging a person as having appeared or as having not appeared in the investment game); d = probability of successful source discrimination (i.e., correctly judging a person as a good or bad investee); g = probability of guessing that a person was a good investee; and b = probability of guessing that a person appeared in the investment game.
education as a covariate, showed that only the main effect of age was significant, F(1, 65) = 4.89, p = 0.031, η p 2 = 0.070.
This indicated that OAs exerted less effort than did YAs. Figure 3 shows the means and SEs of the proportion of correct responses (i.e., "deposit" and "do not deposit" responses to good and bad investees, respectively), or p(c), in the investment game as a function of age-group, game block, and investee's face. An ANCOVA with these three factors and the covariates of years of education, overall memory effort, and the difference in baseline trustworthiness rating between trustworthy-and untrustworthy-looking investees was conducted; the latter two covariates were included to isolate age-related differences in the learning of investees' characters from those in cognitive engagement and perception of facial trustworthiness. The results showed a significant Age × Block interaction, F(3, 189) = 10.79, p < 0.001, η p 2 = 0.146, as well as a significant main effect of age. A linear increase in p(c) across blocks was significantly greater than 0 among both OAs, β = 0.034, 95% confidence interval (CI) = [0.020, 0.047], and YAs, β = 0.104, 95% CI = [0.088, 0.120], confirming that the learning occurred in both agegroups. As indicated by the Age × Block interaction, however, the learning curve was steeper for YAs than for OAs. Table 2 describes the observed probabilities of each category of responses in the trustworthiness memory test as a function of age-group and investee's face and character. Overall, relative to YAs, OAs appeared to be less likely to make correct responses and more likely to make face-congruent responses (i.e., judging trustworthy-and untrustworthy-looking investees as good and bad, respectively). The MPT model shown in Figure 2 was fit to the data to estimate the contributions of item recognition, source discrimination, and guessing to the observed performance (see Analysis in the Method section for details). Table 3 provides the parameter estimates of the model. The fit of the model to the data was satisfactory, G 2 (2) = 2.71, p = 0.258. Table 4 summarizes the results of a series of statistical tests examining the effects of age-group and investee's face on the parameter estimates. The following significant differences were noted: (a) relative to YAs, OAs were less accurate in recognizing bad investees as having appeared in the investment game, irrespective of the investee's facial trustworthiness; (b) relative to YAs, OAs had a greater bias toward guessing that trustworthy-looking persons were good; and (c) among OAs, the bias for guessing that a given person was a good investee was greater when the person looked trustworthy than when he/she looked untrustworthy.
MPT Modeling (Trustworthiness Memory Test)
Discussion
With regard to the main objective of this study, I found that aging was associated with a decline in ability to adjust judgments regarding the trustworthiness of others in response to their cooperative or cheating behaviors during repeated social exchanges. Specifically, unlike YAs, OAs showed a bias toward trusting trustworthy-looking persons more than untrustworthy-looking ones even after they had played four rounds of the trust game and were cheated by trustworthy-looking persons as often as by untrustworthy-looking ones. In other words, OAs seem to be poorer than YAs at learning to abstain from face-based trustworthiness judgment when facial appearance is uninformative, which corresponds to the view that aging may interfere with learning-based adjustments in decision making (Eppinger et al., 2011; Mata et al., 2011; Samanez-Larkin & Knutson, 2015) . Although Bell et al.'s (2013) finding that source memory accuracy was enhanced by face-character discrepancy in YAs but not in OAs was not replicated, the results of this study are consistent with their claim that OAs' trustworthiness judgment is less malleable than is YAs'. Furthermore, the author has extended this implication by showing that agerelated decline in flexibility is evident even in repeated social exchanges (i.e., when adaptive adjustments in trustworthiness judgment are task relevant). Additionally, relative to YAs, OAs were less accurate in recognizing cheaters (bad investees). This result is potentially interesting, but the use of different constraints between OAs and YAs in the estimation of recognition accuracy (i.e., D Good was set to equal to D Bad only in YAs) may not allow for straightforward interpretation. OAs' adherence to invalid face-based trustworthiness judgments seems to contradict previous findings that OAs give more weight to diagnostic information than do YAs when making trait inferences (Hess & Auman, 2001; Hess et al., 1999) . However, it has also been argued that agerelated increases in the use of trait diagnostic information might reflect the development of procedural knowledge (Hess & Auman, 2001) . Given the prevalence of facebased trait judgment in the real world (Todorov, Olivola, Dotsch, & Mende-Siedlecki, 2015) , it may become increasingly proceduralized with advancing age. Thus, age-related increases in reliance on facial appearance in trustworthiness judgment might be due to the occasional inappropriate application of social procedural knowledge (Hess, 2006) . However, the associative deficit hypothesis (NavehBenjamin, 2000; Old & Naveh-Benjamin, 2008) would posit that OAs have difficulty in forming associations between investees and their characters that may leave them no choice but to make guesses based on facial appearance. This difficulty might also be amplified by the somewhat unique procedure of the memory test used in this study, wherein the distracter faces (i.e., the noninvestee faces) are not new but were already seen in the baseline trustworthiness rating; usually, new items serve as distracters in a source memory task. Yet another possibility is that OAs' preferential attention to positive faces (Mather & Carstensen, 2003) leads them to view trustworthy-looking investees longer during the investment game. This viewing bias could further increase the attractiveness of the trustworthy-looking investees (Shimojo, Simion, Shimojo, & Scheier, 2003) , which in turn would lead OAs to trust these investees more (Wilson & Eckel, 2006) . Although there was no significant support for OAs having poor memory for investee-character associations (at least in terms of d parameters; see Table 4 ) or preferentially viewing trustworthy-looking faces versus untrustworthy-looking faces (see Supplementary Table 1) , these explanations cannot be fully discounted because the present study had limited statistical power due to the small sample sizes for each age-group. Thus, the low statistical power might underlie my failure to find any significant age-related differences in source memory accuracy (d parameters), unlike Bell et al. (2013) , which should not be taken as evidence for no difference. One way to disentangle the different explanations for age-related increases in face-based guessing bias would be to assess interindividual relationships between the bias and the various related factors, such as the belief in the informativeness of facial appearance, associative memory, and viewing time. However, the MPT modeling analysis in this paper used data aggregated by age-group, which unfortunately precludes any examination of individual differences. Although a hierarchical extension of MPT modeling (Smith & Batchelder, 2010) could achieve this goal, even with the present analysis (which is far simpler than would be that with the hierarchical extension), a number of parameter estimates had rather wide CIs (Table 3) . Thus, the experimental tasks would need to be modified to include more data (trials) per condition to ensure precise parameter estimation under a more complex hierarchical model. With these methodological refinements, elucidating the mechanisms underlying age-related increases in face-congruent guessing will be an essential future direction.
Some other limitations of this study also warrant consideration. First, my experimental tasks may be criticized for their low ecological validity. In particular, the investment of 1 million yen would have sounded unrealistic, and therefore, OAs may have allocated few cognitive resources to the investment game due to its perceived meaninglessness (Hess, 2014) . Replication using a more ecologically valid task would be important (Isaacowitz & Stanley, 2011) . Second, YAs may have had some advantages over OAs in memorizing the young face stimuli used in this study (i.e., own-age bias; Rhodes & Anastasi, 2012) . In fact, when interviewed, YAs stated more often than did OAs that they visualized acquaintances and celebrities to remember the investees (see Supplementary Table 2) . Thus, OAs might show better performance if OAs' faces were used as stimuli. Although this possibility may merit empirical study, the findings of this study still have a notable practical implication considering that fraud is committed far more often by YAs than by OAs. Finally, there are factors of theoretical interest that were not controlled for or manipulated in this study, such as social attributes of the investees' faces other than trustworthiness (e.g., attractiveness; Zebrowitz, Franklin, Hillman, & Boc, 2013) and reversals or changes in investees' behaviors (Nashiro, Mather, Gorlick, & Nga, 2011) . It thus remains to be seen whether OAs are susceptible to physiognomic features other than trustworthiness and whether OAs adhere to not only someone's appearance but also his or her initial behavior during social exchange.
In conclusion, this study demonstrated that, unlike YAs, OAs judge someone's trustworthiness based on facial appearance even after repeatedly experiencing that such face-based judgments are invalid. Since cheaters can pretend to look trustworthy to obtain another's trust, persistent reliance on appearance cues in trustworthiness judgment would heighten the risk of repeated fraud victimization among OAs. This possibility has direct consequences for the safety of OAs and therefore requires further investigation.
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